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Abstract: 
Elicitation methods in decision making under risk allow a researcher to infer the 
subjective utilities of outcomes as well as the subjective weights of probabilities from the 
observed preferences of an individual. An optimally efficient elicitation method is proposed, 
which takes into account the inevitable distortion of preferences by random errors and minimizes 
the effect of such errors on the inferred utility and probability weighting functions. Under mild 
assumptions, the optimally efficient method for eliciting utilities (weights) of many outcomes 
(probabilities) is the following three-stage procedure. First, a probability is elicited whose 
subjective weight is one half. Second, an individual’s utility function is elicited through the 
midpoint chaining certainty equivalent method employing the probability elicited at the first stage 
as an input. Finally, an individual’s probability weighting function is elicited through the 
probability equivalent method.    
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Efficient elicitation of utility and probability weighting functions  
1. Introduction 
A choice-based elicitation procedure allows to infer the economic characteristics of an 
individual from the observed choice decisions of this individual. In choice under risk (e.g. Knight 
1921) an important characteristic of an individual is his or her utility of outcomes (e.g. von 
Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). One of the first attempts to elicit an individual’s utility 
function RR: !u  can be found in Ramsey (1931). Classical non-parametric elicitation 
methods such as certainty equivalent and probability equivalent methods (e.g. Farquhar 1984) 
allow a researcher to infer the utility function of an individual without assuming a specific 
parametric form and without excluding the heterogeneity in the individual’s preferences. 
Unfortunately, the classical elicitation methods are not robust when individuals distort or 
misperceive probabilities (e.g. Karmarkar 1978, McCord and de Neufville 1986, von Winterfeldt 
and Edwards 1986, Tversky and Fox 1995). 
Prominent descriptive decision theories such as rank-dependent expected utility theory, or 
RDEU, (e.g. Quiggin 1982) and cumulative prospect theory, or CPT, (e.g. Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992) model the probability distortions in decision making under risk through a 
probability weighting function " # " #1,01,0: !w . The method for eliciting subjective utility 
function is called robust if the inferred utility function of an individual is independent from the 
probability weighting function of an individual. The tradeoff method, the first robust elicitation 
method, was proposed by Wakker and Deneffe (1996). Based on the tradeoff method, Abdellaoui 
(2000) generated a robust non-parametric elicitation of both utility and probability weighting 
functions. Other robust though not completely non-parametric elicitation methods were proposed 
by Gonzalez and Wu (1999) and Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000). However, the existing literature on 
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the elicitation methods does not address the role of random error in decision making under risk. 
This paper constructs a robust non-parametric procedure for eliciting an individual’s utility and 
probability weighting functions which is also optimally efficient i.e. it minimizes the propagation 
of random errors1. 
Camerer (1989), Starmer and Sugden (1989) and Wu (1994) provide an extensive 
experimental evidence that there is some degree of randomness in the observed individual 
preference between lotteries. Smith and Walker (1993) and Harless and Camerer (1994, p.1265) 
found that real incentives reduce the randomness in individual responses. However, a researcher 
eliciting an individual’s utility and probability weighting functions typically cannot afford the use 
of real incentives (e.g. Fennema and van Assen, 1998, Abdellaoui, 2000, Bleichrodt and Pinto, 
2000, Abdellaoui et al. 2003, Etchart-Vincent 2004). Thus, the design of the elicitation methods 
should address fundamental problems caused by random error. An efficient elicitation procedure 
minimizes the impact of random errors on the inferred utility and probability weighting functions 
of an individual. To make a formal argument the structure of the stochastic element must be 
specified. 
There is no consensus in the literature on the structure of stochastic utility. Harless and 
Camerer (1994, pp. 1260-1261) propose a constant choice-independent error rate with which the 
true asymmetric preference relation of an individual can reverse. Such a model does not work 
particularly well in the context of elicitation methods since these mathods rely on the symmetric 
(indifference) preference relation of an individual. Luce and Suppes (1965, p.335) and Camerer 
and Ho (1994, p.187) propose a logit form of stochastic utility. Loomes and Sugden (1995, 1998) 
argue that random errors directly affect a preference relation of an individual rather than an 
                                                 
1 Abdellaoui et al. (2004) referred to an elicitation method as efficient in a different sense—when an elicitation 
method is composed of fewer measurement questions. Following Wakker and Deneffe (1996) I will call such a 
method as less laborious. 
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individual’s utility of lotteries. Hey and Orme (1994, p.1301) and Gonzalez and Wu (1999) 
propose an additive, normally distributed error term on the utility scale. Primarily for simplicity 
reasons and as a reasonably justifiable assumption, this paper also employs an additive, 
independently distributed error term on the RDEU-scale. With this structure of an error term, an 
elicitation procedure is claimed to be optimally efficient if it minimizes the expected sum of 
squared errors of the inferred utilities (weights) of a fixed number of elicited outcomes 
(probabilities). 
The elicitation methods considered in this paper allow a researcher to infer the values of 
utility and probability weighing functions of an individual from the elicited subjective 
indifference relations between the lotteries. This paper considers two-outcome lotteries only. The 
notation $ %ypx ,,  denotes a lottery that yields an outcome x with probability p and an outcome 
xy &  with probability p'1 . In the remainder of this paper it is assumed that the appropriate 
technique for extracting the indifference relation of an individual between two lotteries is 
available (see section 5.2 in Farquhar 1984 for a review). The indifference relations to be elicited 
are interrelated so that they impose sufficient restrictions on the utility and probability weighting 
functions of an individual. This enables a researcher to infer the values of the latter: an individual 
is indifferent between the lotteries 1L   and 2L  if and only if his or her utility from the lottery 1L  
is equal to his or her utility from the lottery 2L  plus a random error term. According to the 
expected utility theory, utility from the lottery $ %ypx ,,  is given by $ % $ % $ %yupxup (')( 1 , while 
both RDEU and CPT (if x and y are gains) suggest that this utility equals to 
$ % $ % $ %$ % $ %yupwxupw (')( 1 . 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the existing 
elicitation methods. Section three introduces a three-stage procedure which is proposed to 
optimize the efficiency of a robust non-parametric elicitation. Section four concludes. 
2. Existing elicitation methods 
 This section reviews the literature on several elicitation methods, frequently sited in the 
paper. Readers, familiar with the existing literature on the elicitation methods, can skip this 
section without the loss of continuity.  
2.1. Certainty equivalence method  
Certainty equivalent (CE) method allows to elicit a sure outcome $ %LCE , which is called 
a certainty equivalent, such that an individual is indifferent between $ %LCE  for certain and a 
lottery L (e.g. Farquhar 1984). Using the fractile CE method, a researcher elicits the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of an individual by obtaining a sequence of certainty 
equivalents $ %iLCE  for the lotteries $ %ypxL ii ,,  where " #xy,  is an interval on which utility 
function is elicited and ip  is a sequence of probabilities (e.g. von Neumann-Morgenstern 1944).
2 
According to the deterministic expected utility theory, an individual’s utility of outcome $ %iLCE  
is just ip  when $ % 0*yu  and $ % 1*xu  are normalized by assumption (e.g. Keeney and Raiffa 
1976). 
Using the chaining CE method, a researcher picks several probabilities ip  and elicits first 
the certainty equivalents $ %iLCE  of the lotteries $ %ypxL ii ,, . Subsequently, the researcher elicits 
the certainty equivalents of the lotteries $ %$ %11 ,, LCEpxL ii , $ % $ %$ %212 ,, LCEpLCEL ii , … 
                                                 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, throughout the paper index i goes from unity to some natural number 1+n  i.e. 
" #ni ,1, . 
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$ %$ %ypLCEL iiii ,,  and so forth (e.g. Farquhar 1984). The midpoint chaining refers to a special 
case of the chaining CE method, when only one probability 5.01 *p   is used (e.g. 
Krzysztofowicz and Duckstein 1980). The CE method remains valid only under the expected 
utility theory and it is not robust to the non-linear weighting of probabilities. Different biases and 
distortions associated with the CE method were discovered inter alia by Krzysztofowicz and 
Duckstein (1980), Hershey et al. (1982), and Hershey. and Schoemaker (1985). The CE method 
is a non-parametric elicitation method. 
2.2. Probability equivalence method  
The probability equivalent (PE) method allows to elicit a probability ip  such that an 
individual is indifferent between the lottery $ %ypxL ii ,,  and an outcome " #xyzi ,,  for certain. 
According to the deterministic expected utility theory, an individual’s utility of iz  is just ip  
when $ % 0*yu  and $ % 1*xu  are normalized by assumption (e.g. Farquhar 1984). The PE method 
allows to elicit the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of an individual without chaining 
the earlier responses to the lotteries involved in subsequent comparisons. However, many 
individuals find the probability judgment to be cognitively demanding (e.g. Karmarkar 1978). 
The PE method remains valid only under the expected utility theory and it is not robust to the 
non-linear probability weighting. Hershey and Schoemaker (1985) provide an extensive 
experimental evidence of systematic discrepancies between utility functions elicited through the 
CE and PE methods. The PE method is a non-parametric elicitation method. 
2.3. Tradeoff method  
The tradeoff (TO) method proposed by Wakker and Deneffe (1996) is a robust elicitation 
method i.e. it allows to elicit the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of an individual that 
is not affected by the non-linear probability weighting. The TO method allows to elicit a 
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sequence of outcomes nxx ,...,1 , which is called a standard outcome sequence, such that an 
individual is indifferent between lotteries $ %Rpxi ,,1'  and $ %rpxi ,,  (e.g. Wakker and Deneffe 
1996, Fennema and van Assen 1998). The reference outcomes 00 xRr &&-  are free parameters 
chosen by a researcher.  
The probability p is also arbitrary chosen by a researcher. Wakker and Deneffe (1996) 
recommend to choose 31*p  because a typical individual is most probable to have a minimum 
subjective distortion of probability in the neighborhood of 31*p  (e.g. Tversky and Fox 1995, 
Prelec 1998). Apparently, this consideration motivated Wakker and Daneffe (1996), Fennema 
and van Assen (1998), Abdellaoui et al. (2002, 2004) and Etchart-Vincent (2004) to use the TO 
method with 31*p . Other probabilities used in the literature are 21*p  (e.g. Bleichrodt and 
Pinto 2000) and 32*p  (e.g. Abdellaoui 2000). 
According to the deterministic expected utility theory, RDEU, and CPT an individual’s 
utility of ix  is just ni  when $ % 0*yu  and $ % 1*xu  are normalized by assumption (e.g. Wakker 
and Deneffe 1996).3 Thus, the elements of a standard outcome sequence are equally spaced in 
terms of the subjective utility. The TO method remains valid when the probabilities are weighted 
non-linearly or even when the probabilities are unknown. Thus, the TO method is applicable both 
to the decisions under risk and uncertainty. The TO method is a non-parametric elicitation 
method. 
2.4. Elicitation of probability weighting function  
CE, PE and TO methods described above allow to elicit the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function of an individual. However, to describe an individual’s decision making under risk 
                                                 
3 For simplicity, this paper considers only lotteries yielding gains (monetary outcomes above a reference point, 
typically zero). Thus, the predictions of rank-dependent expected utility theory and cumulative prospect theory 
coincide. The extension of TO method to losses is straightforward (e.g. Etchart-Vincent 2004) 
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completely his or her probability weighting function must be elicited as well. This section 
summarizes two approaches for eliciting a probability weighting function that are based on the 
TO method. Thus, as a starting point, the TO method is used to elicit a standard outcome 
sequence nxx ,...,1 . 
Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) propose the following approach to elicit a subjective 
probability weighting function. For any probability 5.0-p  a researcher elicits an outcome x.  
such that an individual is indifferent between the lottery $ %ji xpx ,,  and the lottery $ %xpxk .,, , 
where outcomes kji xxx ,,  are the elements of the standard outcome sequence such that 
jik xxx ++ . According to the deterministic RDEU and CPT, $ %
$ %
$ %xunikj
xunjpw
.('')
.('
*  (e.g. 
equation (8) in Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000). For any probability 5.0/p  a researcher elicits an 
outcome x.  such that an individual is indifferent between the lottery $ %ji xpx ,,  and the lottery 
$ %kxpx ,,. , where outcomes kji xxx ,,  are the elements of the standard outcome sequence such 
that kji xxx ++ . According to the deterministic RDEU and CPT, $ % $ % ikjxun
kjpw
'').(
'
*  
(e.g. equation (9) in Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000). 
To infer the weight of a probability p a researcher must know the utility of an outcome 
x. . Since in general the outcome x.  does not belong to the standard outcome sequence, 
Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) calculate $ %xu .  through a linear interpolation $ % $ %nxx
xx
n
lxu
lm
l
'
'.
)0.  
where an outcome lx  is the element of the standard outcome sequence such that 1)-.- ll xxx . 
Thus, the approach of Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) is based on the parametric fitting of a 
piecewise linear utility function. 
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 Abdellaoui (2000) proposes a different approach. A subjective probability weighting 
function is elicited through the PE method using the standard outcome sequence as an input. A 
researcher elicits a sequence of probabilities 11 ,..., 'npp , which is called a standard sequence of 
probabilities, such that an individual is indifferent between the lottery $ %0,, xpx in  and an 
outcome ix  for certain. According to the deterministic RDEU and CPT, $ % nipw i *  even 
without assuming a normalization $ % $ % 1,00 ** nxuxu . Notice that according to the deterministic 
expected utility theory a probability ip  is uniquely determined as nipi *  and, thus, its 
elicitation is nothing but a consistency check.  
The approach of Abdellaoui (2000) changes the response scale i.e. an individual first 
gives his or her answers in terms of monetary outcomes (in the TO questions) and then—in terms 
of probabilities (in the PE questions). Tversky et al. (1988) and Delquie (1993) provide an 
evidence that a preference elicitation may be distorted when the response scale is varied. The 
approach of Abdellaoui (2000) is non-parametric. 
2.5. Other elicitation methods  
Gonzalez and Wu (1999) propose a robust method for the simultaneous elicitation of 
utility and probability weighting functions through the alternating least squares approach. To 
infer the subjective utilities of outcomes nxx ,...,1  and the subjective weights of probabilities 
mpp ,...,1 , a researcher experimentally elicits the certainty equivalents ijlCE  of (many) lotteries 
$ %lji xpx ,, , " # " #mjnli ,1,,1, ,, . Subsequently, $ %ixu  and $ %jpw  are chosen as free parameters. 
The subjective utility of every certainty equivalent $ %ijlCEu  is approximated through a linear 
interpolation of the utility function based on the assumed values of $ %ixu . Finally, the parameters 
$ %ixu  and $ %jpw  are chosen iteratively to minimize the discrepancy between $ %ijlCEu  and the 
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utility of a corresponding lottery $ %lji xpx ,,  under RDEU and CPT. The approach of Gonzalez 
and Wu (1999) is based on the parametric fitting of a piecewise linear utility function. 
Abdellaoui et al. (2004) propose a robust two-step procedure for eliciting an individual’s 
utility function. First, Abdellaoui et al. (2004) elicit a probability p whose subjective weight is 
one half. This elicitation is done through the approach of Abdellaoui (2000), described in section 
2.4, with the standard outcome sequence consisting of three outcomes. Second, Abdellaoui et al. 
(2004) elicit an individual’s utility function through the midpoint chaining CE method described 
in section 2.1 with the elicited probability $ %5.01'* wp  being used instead of the probability 
5.01 *p . The approach of Abdellaoui et al. (2004) is non-parametric. 
Ghirardato et al. (2003) proposed a theoretical method for the robust elicitation of an 
individual’s utility function. An outcome " #xyz ,,  is called a preference average of outcomes x 
and y given a non-degenerate probability p if an individual is indifferent between the lottery 
$ %ypx ,,  and the compound lottery $ % $ %$ %ypzpzpx ,,,,,, . According to the RDEU, 
$ % $ % $ %yuxuzu ()(* 5.05.0  (e.g. Ghirardato et al. 2003). Furthermore, a preference average of 
outcomes x and z has an utility of $ % $ %yuxu ()( 25.075.0 . Proceeding along these lines, a 
researcher is able to infer an individual’s utility function over the entire interval " #xy,  through 
the chaining elicitation of preference averages. However, Abdellaoui et al. (2004) argue that the 
experimental elicitation of preference averages is a cognitively demanding task for the subjects 
because the method of Ghirardato et al. (2003) involves compound lotteries. The method of 
Ghirardato et al. (2003) is non-parametric. 
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3. Three-stage procedure 
To infer an individual’s utility of n outcomes and an individual’s weight of n 
probabilities, a researcher employs a three-stage (3S) procedure, which is non-parametric and 
robust to the non-linear weighting of probabilities. First, a researcher chooses a relatively small 
number " #1,1 ', nk  of non-degenerate probabilities whose weights are elicited through the 
approach of Abdellaoui (2000) described in section 2.4. At one extreme, when a researcher 
chooses 1'* nk  the proposed 3S procedure consists of only one stage and coincides with the 
approach of Abdellaoui (2000). At the other extreme, when a researcher chooses 1*k  the first 
stage of 3S procedure coincides with the first stage of the method of Abdellaoui et al. (2004) as 
described in section 2.5. 
Second, a researcher elicits an individual’s utility function through the chaining CE 
method described in section 2.1. k probabilities elicited at the first stage are used as an input for 
the CE method. The subjective weight of the probabilities elicited at the first stage is already 
known. Thus, a researcher can control for the non-linear weighting of probabilities and the 
chaining CE method becomes robust to probability distortions. After Nm,  iterations of the 
chaining CE method a researcher obtains $ % 11 )) mk  outcomes at which the value of an 
individual’s utility function is known. For simplicity reasons I assume that $ % 11 ))* mkn  so that 
exactly m iterations of the chaining CE method are required to elicit the desired number of 
outcomes. When 1*k  the first and the second stage of 3S procedure coincide with the method of 
Abdellaoui et al. (2004).  
Third, a researcher elicits an individual’s probability weighting function through the PE 
method described in section 2.2. The outcomes elicited at the second stage are used as an input 
for the PE method. Since TO, CE and PE methods are non-parametric elicitation methods, the 
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proposed 3S procedure, which is a combination of TO, CE and PE methods, is also a non-
parametric elicitation procedure. The 3S procedure can be further extended in the following way. 
Consider the situation when $ % 11 ))&& mkn . After the third stage a researcher proceeds again with 
the second stage, using a richer set of probabilities whose subjective weight has been just elicited 
at the third stage. Thus, the second and the third stages are repeated in a cycle until a desired 
number n of outcomes/probabilities is elicited. This extension, however, is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
The choice parameter for a researcher is a number k of non-degenerate probabilities 
whose subjective weights are elicited at the first stage. For a fixed number n of outcomes 
(probabilities) whose subjective utility (weight) is to be elicited: the number of iterations m is 
uniquely determined from the choice of k e.g. 1log 1 '* ) nm k . In the following sub-sections 3.1-
3.3 the propagation of random errors is analyzed for every stage of the proposed 3S procedure. 
Sub-section 3.4 demonstrates how a researcher chooses the optimal number k to minimize the 
propagation of error across all stages of the elicitation procedure. 
3.1. Propagation of error at stage one  
At the first stage a researcher elicits Nk ,  non-degenerate probabilities whose subjective 
weight is inferred through the approach of Abdellaoui (2000). A standard outcome sequence 
11,..., )kxx  is elicited initially though the TO method (presented in section 2.3). An individual is 
asked 1)k  times to reveal such an outcome ix  that makes him or her indifferent between the 
lotteries $ %Rpxi ,,1'  and $ %rpxi ,,  with the reference outcomes 00 xRr &&-  and a probability p 
being fixed by a researcher. Assuming an additive, independently distributed error term 
$ %21,0~ 12 TO  on the utility scale (e.g. Hey and Orme 1994, Gonzalez and Wu 1999), the 
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indifference relations elicited through the TO method can be rewritten under RDEU as well as 
under CPT as the system of equations (1). 
$ % $ % $ %$ % $ % $ % $ % $ %$ % $ % TOiii rupwxupwRupwxupw 2)')*')' 111 , " #1,1 ), ki  (1) 
Assuming a normalization $ % $ % 1,0 10 ** )kxuxu , the recursive system (1) can be rewritten as (2). 
$ % $ % 3
3
4
5
66
7
8
)
')
)
* 99
)
**
1
11 1
1
1
k
j
TO
j
i
j
TO
ji k
i
pwk
ixu 22 , " #1,1 ), ki   (2) 
It follows from the system of equations (2) that an individual’s utility of every elicited 
outcome ix  has the expectation $ %$ % 1)* k
ixuE i  and the variance 
$ %$ % $ % 34
5
6
7
8
)
'(*
1
1var 2
2
1
k
ii
pw
xu i
1 . Thus, the utility of the median member of the standard outcome 
sequence $ %$ %21)kxu  has the highest variance $ %$ %pw
k
2
2
1
4
11)  and the utility of the first and the last 
member of the standard outcome sequence have the lowest variance. In other words, under the 
TO method random errors distort the inferred utility of the medium members of the standard 
outcome sequence more severely. The propagation of an error is less severe for the first and the 
last members of the standard outcome sequence. In contrast, Wakker and Deneffe (1996, p. 1148) 
intuitively suggested that the error propagation is increasing for the later members of the standard 
outcome sequence. 
Subsequently, a researcher elicits a standard sequence of probabilities kpp ,...,1  through 
the PE method (presented in section 2.2) using the elicited standard outcome sequence 11 ,..., )kxx . 
Assuming an additive, independently distributed error term $ %22,0~ 12 PE  on the utility scale, the 
indifference relations elicited through the PE method can be rewritten under RDEU as well as 
under CPT as a system of equations (3). 
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$ % $ % $ %
PE
i
k
j
TO
j
i
j
TO
j
PE
iii k
i
pwk
ixupw 2222 )33
4
5
66
7
8
)
')
)
*)* 99
)
**
1
11 1
1
1
, " #ki ,1,   (3) 
In general, a random error occurring when the PE method is used can have a different variance 
than the random error occurring under the TO method because two methods employ different 
types of elicitation questions. Thus, 12 11 /  when the questions employed in the PE method are 
more cognitively demanding than the questions employed in the TO method and 12 11 &  
otherwise. It follows from the system of equations (3) that an individual’s weight of every 
elicited probability ip  has the expectation $ %$ % 1)* k
ipwE i  and the variance 
$ %$ % $ %
2
22
2
1
1
1var 11 )3
4
5
6
7
8
)
'(*
k
ii
pw
pw i . Under the PE method random errors do not propagate—
the error PEi2  affects solely the inferred weight of the probability ip  and it does not affect the 
inferred weights of the other probabilities. 
3.2. Propagation of error at stage two  
 
At the end of the first stage a standard outcome sequence 11,..., )kxx  is already elicited 
though the TO method. An individual’s utility of 1)k  members of this sequence is determined 
by the system of equations (2). At the second stage a researcher elicits a more refined grid of 
outcomes whose subjective utility is inferred through the chaining CE method. The standard 
outcome sequence partitions the interval " #10 , )kxx  into 1)k  smaller intervals. For every smaller 
interval a researcher elicits the certainty equivalents of k probability mixtures of its upper and 
lower bound. The probability mixtures are constructed using a standard sequence of probabilities 
elicited at the first stage. Overall a researcher elicits $ %1)kk  certainty equivalents during the first 
iteration of the chaining CE method. These newly elicited certainty equivalents together with the 
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standard outcome sequence partition the interval " #10 , )kxx  into $ %21)k  smaller intervals. During 
the second iteration of the chaining CE method, a researcher elicits the certainty equivalents of k 
probability mixtures of the upper and the lower bound of each of those $ %21)k  intervals. The 
same procedure is iterated for m times. Figure 1 illustrates the construction of the refined grid of 
outcomes. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Chaining CE method with multiple probabilities 
During an iteration " #m,1,:  of the chaining CE method a researcher elicits $ %:1)kk  
certainty equivalents. Thus, by the end of the second stage a researcher has elicited $ % 11 )) mk  
outcomes overall whose subjective utility can be inferred in a robust non-parametric way. To 
facilitate a subsequent formal argument, let $ % 110 ,..., )) mkyy  denote the sequence of outcomes 
elicited by the end of the second stage and numbered consecutively so that ji yy /  if and only if 
ji / . Let 01...aaa mm '  denote a natural number written in a number system with a base value 
1)k . Obviously, every digit ia  of such number must be " #kai ,0,  for any " #mi ,0, . The 
conversion of the number 01...aaa mm '  into a decimal number system is 
$ % $ % $ % 0111 1...11 akakaka mmmm ))))))) '' . With the above notation, every outcome elicited 
by the end of the second stage, except for the highest outcome $ % 11 1 )) *) kk xy m , can be denoted as 
01...aaa mm
y
'
, " #kai ,0, , " #mi ,0, . In particular, the members of the standard outcome sequence 
elicited at the first stage 11 ,..., )kxx  are correspondingly denoted as !
 times
0...01
m
y , …, 
!
 times
0...0
m
ky  and !
 times1
0...01
)m
y . 
0x  
0x  
2*m  
1*m  
0*m  
1)kx
1)kx
… 1x  
1x  kx
kx
…
… …
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The indifference relations elicited during an iteration " #m,1,:  of the chaining CE method can be 
then formally written as (4). 
! $ % ! !
" #kaaa
ypyy
mmm
aaaaaaaaaa
m
mmmm
m
mmm
m
mmm
,0,...,,
,,~
1
0...0...0...01...0...0...
 times1
11
 times1
11
 times
1
,;
33
4
5
66
7
8
)''
)
)'
)'''
)'
)''
'
''
::
:
::
:
:
:
:   (4) 
Notice that a number $ % !
 times1
11 0...01...
)'
)'' )
:
:
m
mmm aaa  becomes a number $ % !
 times2
21 0...01...
)'
)'' )
:
:
m
mmm aaa  when kam *)' 1: , 
a number $ % !
 times3
31 0...01...
)'
)'' )
:
:
m
mmm aaa  when kaa mm ** )')' 21 :: , … and a number !
 times1
0...01
)m
 when 
kaa mm ***)' ...1: . Assuming an additive, independently distributed error term $ %23,0~ 12 CE  
on the utility scale, the indifference relations (4) can be rewritten under RDEU as well as CPT as 
a system of equations (5). 
! !
$ %
$ % ! ! !
" # " #mkaaa
yuyu
pwyuyu
mmm
CE
aaaaaaaaa
aaaaaaa
m
mmm
m
mmm
m
mmm
m
m
mmm
m
mmm
,1,,0,...,, 1
0...0...0...0...0...01...
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It follows from the recursive system (5) that random errors propagate in a non-linear 
manner at the second stage. To infer the subjective utility of a newly elicited certainty equivalent, 
a researcher multiplies the utilities of previously elicited outcomes (affected by random errors) by 
the weight elicited at the first stage (which is also affected by random errors). The non-linear 
propagation of errors creates an addition problem for a researcher. To make the unbiased 
inferences of an individual’s utility function, a researcher needs to estimate the variances 211 , 
2
21  
and 231 . In general, under the non-linear propagation of errors the expected values of an 
individual’s utility function are not equally spaced at the outcomes elicited through the chaining 
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CE method. To simplify the formal analysis it is assumed in what follows that random errors 
propagate linearly at stage two. Specifically, instead of system (5) a recursive system (6) is used. 
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Proposition 1 For any outcome 
01...aaa mm
y
'
 elicited by the end of the second stage, the 
inferred subjective utility of 
01...aaa mm
y
'
 has an expectation of $ %$ %
$ % 1
01
... 1
...
01 )
'
)
*
' m
mm
aaa k
aaa
yuE
mm
. 
Proof of proposition 1 and all subsequent propositions is presented in appendix. 
It follows from proposition 1 that at the first and the second stages a researcher elicits a 
sequence of outcomes that are expected to be equally spaced in terms of subjective utility. 
Specifically, after an iteration :  of the chaining CE method the elicited sequence of outcomes 
divides an interval 
!
" #100...010 ,,...,
 times1
)*=>
?
@A
B
)
kxxyy
m
 into $ % 11 )) :k  smaller intervals. The expected 
length of each of these smaller intervals is $ % 111 )) :k  in terms of subjective utility. By the end 
of the second stage a researcher completes the task of utility function elicitation. At the third 
stage only a refined probability weighting function is elicited.  
3.3. Propagation of error at stage three  
 
At the end of the first stage a standard sequence of probabilities kpp ,...,1  is already 
elicited. The subjective weights of kpp ,...,1  can be inferred from equation (3) as 
$ % $ %1,...,11 )) kkk  correspondingly. At the third stage the PE method described in section 2.2 is 
used to elicit a more refined grid of probabilities whose subjective weights can be inferred by a 
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researcher. Specifically, for every outcome  
01...aaa mm
y
'
 elicited at the second stage, an individual is 
asked to reveal such a probability 
01...aaa mm
q
'
 that makes him or her indifferent between the lottery 
$ %0...1 ,, 01 xqx aaak mm ')  and the outcome 01...aaa mmy '  for certain. Assuming an additive and 
independently distributed error term $ %22,0~ 12 PE  on the RDEU-scale, the indifference relations 
elicited at the third stage can be formally written as the system of equations (7). 
$ % $ %
" #kaaa
yuqw
mm
PE
aaaaaaaaa mmmmmm
,0,...,, 01
......... 010101
,;
)*
'
'''
2
  (7) 
It follows from (7) that $ %$ % $ %$ %
$ % 1
01
...... 1
...
0101 )
'
)
**
'' m
mm
aaaaaa k
aaayuEqwE
mmmm
 with the later equality due to 
proposition 1. The system of equations (7) also implies that random errors do not propagate at the 
third stage—an error PE aaa mm 01...'2  affects only the elicitation of the probability 01...aaa mmq '  and it does 
not affect the elicitation of the other probabilities. By the end of the third stage a researcher elicits 
$ % 11 ))* mkn  probabilities that are expected to be equally spaced in terms of subjective weight. 
3.4. Optimally efficient elicitation procedure  
 
Let us assess the efficiency of the 3S procedure with respect to the elicitation of an 
individual’s utility function. The first step is to calculate the expected sum of squared errors 
affecting the inferred utilities of n elicited outcomes. 
Proposition 2 The expected sum of squared errors of the inferred utilities of $ % 11 ))* mkn  
outcomes elicited through the 3S procedure is given by equation (8) when 1Ck  and by equation 
(9) when 1*k . 
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The optimally efficient 3S procedure aims to minimize the expected sum of squared errors 
(8)-(9). To design the optimally efficient elicitation procedure a researcher chooses the number 
" #1,1 ', nk  that minimizes the right hand side (RHS) of the equations (8)-(9). The first part of 
the RHS of equation (8) increases in k. However, the second and the third part of the RHS of 
equation (8), which are presented together in the second line of the equation, both decrease in k. 
Thus, when 021 *1  the first part of the RHS of equation (8) cancels out and the optimal 3S 
procedure is to set k to its maximum 1'* nk . In other words, when the TO elicitation questions 
are cognitively undemanding i.e. in the TO questions the individuals report their indifference 
relations without random errors; the optimal elicitation procedure is the simple TO method as 
described in section 2.3.  
When 023
2
2 ** 11 , the second and the third part of the RHS of equation (8) cancel out. 
The remaining first part of the RHS of equation (8) increases in k. Thus, the optimal 3S 
procedure is to set k to its minimum 1*k . In other words, when the PE and CE elicitation 
questions are cognitively undemanding i.e. they induce no random errors in the elicited responses 
of an individual; the optimal elicitation procedure is the method of Abdellaoui et al. (2004) as 
described in section 2.5. More general result is obtained in proposition 3. 
Proposition 3 Assuming an additive and independently distributed error term on the 
RDEU-scale, such that an error is most distorting in the TO questions and least distorting—in the 
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CE questions i.e. 23
2
2
2
1 111 ++ ; there is a number 
Dn  such that the optimally efficient procedure 
for eliciting an individual’s utility function of D+ nn  outcomes is the 3S procedure with 1*k  
(the method of Abdellaoui et al. 2004). 
There is an established empirical support for the assumption that 23
2
2
2
1 111 ++ . Wakker 
and Deneffe (1996) report that in the experiments the untrained individuals find the TO 
elicitation questions harder to understand compared to the PE and CE elicitation questions. A 
plausible explanation is that the TO questions are more cognitively demanding because they 
involve a comparison of two lotteries rather than a comparison of one lottery and an outcome for 
certain as in the PE and CE questions. This finding can be interpreted that random errors have a 
more distorting effect in the TO elicitation questions compared to the PE and CE questions. In 
other words, 22
2
1 11 +  and 
2
3
2
1 11 + . Ronen (1973) and Karmarkar (1978) report that the 
untrained individuals find the PE elicitation questions more difficult that the CE questions. A 
plausible explanation is that the PE method requires an individual to make a probability 
judgment—a task that occurs seldom in real life experiences. Therefore, the untrained individuals 
are not accustomed to make a probability judgment and they find it more difficult. This 
observation can be interpreted that random errors have a more distorting effect in the PE 
elicitation questions compared to the CE questions. To summarize, the empirical evidence 
suggests that an untrained individual is characterized by an inequality 23
2
2
2
1 111 ++ . 
A threshold Dn  from proposition 3 depends on the volatilities 23
2
2
2
1 ,, 111  and the 
subjective weight $ %pw  of the probability p used by a researcher in the TO method at the first 
stage of the 3S procedure. Specifically, the higher the volatility 211  of random errors in the TO 
elicitation questions, the lower the volatilities 221  and 
2
31  of random errors in the PE and CE 
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elicitation questions, and the lower the weight $ %pw , the lower is the threshold Dn . Thus, if the 
3S procedure with 1*k  is optimally efficient for eliciting D+ nn  outcomes when 23
2
2
2
1 111 **  
then it is moreover optimally efficient for eliciting D+ nn  outcomes when 23
2
2
2
1 111 ++ . When 
2
3
2
2
2
1 111 **  i.e. the distorting effect of random errors is the same in TO, PE and CE elicitation 
questions, a (conservative) value of the threshold Dn  is 11*Dn  if $ % 31-pw , 19*Dn  if 
$ % 21-pw  and 64*Dn  if $ % 32-pw . As discussed in section 2.3 the most popular probability 
chosen for the TO method is 31*p , which typically has a subjective weight $ % 31*pw . Thus, 
the practical implication of the main theoretical result of this paper is that the optimally efficient 
method for eliciting utilities of eleven or more outcomes is the 3S procedure with 1*k  (under 
mild assumptions of proposition 3). No definite statement can be made on the efficiency of 
elicitation methods for eliciting utilities of less than eleven outcomes, unless some stronger 
assumptions are imposed. 
The existing experimental studies that elicit the utility function of an individual by means 
of the simple TO method construct a standard outcome sequence with 6-n  outcomes. Wakker 
and Deneffe (1996) and Fennema and van Assen (1998) use 4*n . Etchart-Vincent (2004) uses 
5*n . Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000), Abdellaoui (2000) and Abdellaoui et al. (2002, 2003) use 
6*n . Von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986, p. 254) intuitively recommend to use 63 -- n . The 
only experimental study that employs the 3S procedure with 1*k , Abdellaoui et al. (2004), 
elicits a subjective utility of 11*n  losses and 8*n  gains. Thus, a current experimental practice 
and the intuitive recommendations in the literature are consistent with the optimally efficient 
elicitation procedure formally derived in proposition 3 that minimizes the expected sum of 
squared errors. 
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So far the optimally efficient elicitation procedure was considered only for the utility 
function. As a next step, consider the optimally efficient elicitation procedure for the probability 
weighting function. It follows from the equations (3) and (7) that the expected sum of squared 
errors of the inferred weights of n probabilities elicited through the 3S procedure is just the 
expected sum of squared errors (8)-(9) of the inferred utilities of n outcomes elicited through the 
3S procedure plus a constant 221n . Since the objective function (8) to be minimized is the same 
in both cases (except for a constant), the optimally efficient elicitation procedure for the 
probability weighting function is the same as that for the utility function. 
4. Conclusion 
Propagation of random errors constitutes a fundamental challenge for the elicitation 
methods in decision making under risk. Although this problem was recognized since long, the 
existing literature is limited to the informal arguments (e.g. Wakker and Deneffe 1996) and 
intuitive recommendations (e.g. von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986) how to minimize the 
propagation or random errors. Partially this is due to the lack of consensus on the structure of 
stochastic utility since little is known how random errors enter into an individual’s decision 
making under risk. As a starting point for a formal argument, this paper assumes a specific error 
term—an additive, independently distributed error on the RDEU-scale—and derives an optimally 
efficient elicitation procedure that minimizes the expected sum of squared errors. An interesting 
extension of this paper is to compare its result with optimally efficient procedures derived from 
other structures of random error. 
Under mild assumptions, the derived optimally efficient method for eliciting subjective 
utilities (weights) of many outcomes (probabilities) is the following three-stage procedure. First, 
a probability, whose subjective weight is one half, is elicited through the approach of Abdellaoui 
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(2000). Second, an individual’s utility function is elicited through the midpoint chaining CE 
method using the probability elicited at the first stage as an input. Third, an individual’s 
probability weighting function is elicited through the PE method using the outcomes elicited at 
the second stage as an input. This elicitation procedure is non-parametric (no assumption about 
the functional form of utility and probability weighting functions is made) and robust (the 
inferred subjective utility function is independent from the inferred subjective probability 
weighting function). The first two steps of this procedure are used by Abdellaoui et al. (2004) for 
the experimental elicitation of utility function. Thus, this paper can be regarded as a theoretical 
complement of Abdellaoui et al. (2004) providing insights on the optimal efficiency of their 
elicitation method. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of proposition 1  
For convenient notation, let $ % 3
3
4
5
66
7
8
)
'* 99
)
**
1
11 1
1 k
j
TO
j
i
j
TO
ji k
i
pw
22E  denote an error distorting 
the inferred subjective utility (2) of an outcome ix  that is a member of a standard outcome 
sequence elicited at stage one, " #1.1 ), ki . In section 3.1 it was already established that 
$ % 3
3
4
5
66
7
8
3
4
5
6
7
8
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1
1,0~ 2
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k
ii
pwi
1
F . Using the definition of iF  we can rewrite (2) as (A1). 
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iteration " #m,1,:  of the chaining CE method is given by (A2). 
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Proof by mathematical induction. When 1*:  the system of equations (6) becomes (A3). 
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The outcomes 
!
 times
0...0
m
ma
y  and $ %!
 times
0...01
m
ma
y )  are members of the standard outcome sequence max  and 
1)ma
x  correspondingly. An individual’s utility of outcomes 
!
 times
0...0
m
ma
y  and $ %!
 times
0...01
m
ma
y )  is given by 
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(A1). In particular, $ %! ! 334
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yuEyuE  is just equal to $ %11 )k  for any 
" #kam ,0, . Probability 0ap  is elicited at stage one and its subjective weight is determined by 
equation (3). Thus, the system of equations (A3) can be rewritten as (A4). 
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Thus, lemma A1 holds for 1*: . Assume that lemma A1 holds also for any " #1,1 ', m: . 
Let us prove that lemma 1 holds for m*:  as well. When m*:  the system of equations (6) 
becomes (A5). 
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The assumption that lemma A1 holds for any iteration " #1,1 ', m:  implies that 
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The weight $ %
0a
pw  is equal to $ % PEaaka 0010 2F )))  due to equation (3). Plugging these results 
into the system of equations (A5) yields (A6), which is nothing but (A2) for the case m*: . 
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Thus, lemma A1 holds also for m*: . Taking the expectation operator from the lest and the 
right hand side of (A6) yields immediately $ %$ %
$ % 1
01
... 1
...
01 )
'
)
*
' m
mm
aaa k
aaa
yuE
mm
. Q.E.D. 
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Proof of proposition 2  
The expected sum of squared errors of the inferred utilities of $ % 11 ))* mkn  outcomes 
elicited through the 3S procedure is given by (A7). 
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In equation (A7) we already exploited the fact that 
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equations A2). Plugging (A2) into (A7) yields (A8). 
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Since random errors are independently distributed one can rewrite (A8) as (A9). 
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To proceed further one needs to calculate the following sums: 
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where we exploited the fact that 
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where we exploited the fact that 
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While calculating sum b) we implicitly assumed that 1Ck  i.e. the division by 1'k  is possible. 
When 1*k  we obtain that 
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Plugging sums a)-d) into equation (A9) and substituting for 1log 1 '* ) nm k  yields immediately 
the RHS of equation (8). Plugging sums a), b`), c) and d) into equation (A9) and substituting for 
1*k  yields immediately the RHS of equation (9). Q.E.D. 
Proof of proposition 3  
The 3S procedure with 1*k  is optimally efficient when 0
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** kk
SSS . The sum 
of squared errors 
2*k
S  is given by the equation (8) when 2*k , and the sum of squared errors 
1*k
S  is given by the equation (9). Since 23
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1 111 ++ , the difference in the expected sums of 
squared errors 
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SSS  has a lower bound (A12). 
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  (A12) 
When 3*n , the RHS of the equation (A12) becomes negative if the weight $ %pw  is greater than 
0.135. Thus, the 3S procedure with 1*k  is not necessarily efficient when 3*n . However, when 
)J!n , the RHS of the equation (A12) becomes strictly positive. Since the sum of squared 
errors S is a continuous function of n, there exists a threshold 3+Dn  such that 0/IS  for every 
D+ nn . Q.E.D. 
